Regulation of Nitrogen Pollution: Taxes versus Quotas by Choi, E. Kwan & Feinerman, Eli
Economics Publications Economics
1995
Regulation of Nitrogen Pollution: Taxes versus
Quotas
E. Kwan Choi
Iowa State University, kchoi@iastate.edu
Eli Feinerman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the Environmental Studies Commons, Other Economics Commons, and the Petroleum
Engineering Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/108. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Regulation of Nitrogen Pollution: Taxes versus Quotas
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of first-best policies to regulate nitrogen application. Some nitrogen
fertilizer is applied ex ante before a random rainfall, but side dressed nitrogen may be applied ex post. First-
best policy is a tax or a quota on ex ante application, because side dressed nitrogen is not leached. Since a risk-
averse farmer uses more nitrogen ex ante than a risk-neutral farmer, a higher tax must be imposed on the
former. Action equivalent first-best taxes and quotas are also welfare equivalent. An empirical model for wheat
in Israel was used to demonstrate the analytical
Keywords
first-best policy, quotas, taxes
Disciplines
Environmental Studies | Other Economics | Petroleum Engineering
Comments
This is an article from Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 20 (1995): 122. Posted with permission.
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs/108
Western Agricultural Economics Association
 
Regulation of Nitrogen Pollution: Taxes versus Quotas
Author(s): E. Kwan Choi and  Eli Feinerman
Source: Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1 (July 1995), pp.
122-134
Published by: Western Agricultural Economics Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40986869
Accessed: 31-08-2016 18:49 UTC
 
REFERENCES 
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40986869?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents 
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Western Agricultural Economics Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.188 on Wed, 31 Aug 2016 18:49:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 20( 1 ): 1 22-1 34
 Copyright 1995 Western Agricultural Economics Association
 Regulation of Nitrogen Pollution: Taxes versus Quotas
 E. Kwan Choi and Eli Feinerman
 This paper investigates the effects of first-best policies to regulate nitrogen application. Some
 nitrogen fertilizer is applied ex ante before a random rainfall, but sidedressed nitrogen may
 be applied ex post. First-best policy is a tax or a quota on ex ante application, because
 sidedressed nitrogen is not leached. Since a risk-averse farmer uses more nitrogen ex ante
 than a risk-neutral farmer, a higher tax must be imposed on the former. Action equivalent
 first-best taxes and quotas are also welfare equivalent. An empirical model for wheat in Israel
 was used to demonstrate the analytical findings.
 Key words: first-best policy, quotas, taxes
 Introduction
 Recent years have witnessed a growing concern about the environmental cost of nitrogen
 fertilizer, which escapes to surface and groundwater supplies and is a potential source of
 ozone layer destruction (Swanson; National Research Council). Since the 1950s, total
 nitrogen fertilizer use in the U.S. has increased approximately 400%. Similarly, nitrogen use
 in Israel during the last two decades more than doubled.
 Nitrogen is used as an essential plant nutrient, but only about 50-70% is actually taken
 up by crops and the remainder is mineralized, incorporated in the soil's organic matter, and
 lost by denitri ficat ion and volatilization and by leaching (Keeney). While pesticides and
 herbicides are regulated, at present, nitrogen is not regulated in many regions of the U.S.
 and Israel. In the absence of direct government regulation, farmers have no incentives to
 take into account the negative environmental externalities arising from nitrogen use. Input
 decisions of farmers are based solely on private interests and the potential social costs or
 health risks are completely ignored. In this situation, nitrogen applications are excessive
 when compared to the situation where the external costs are internalized into the decision-
 maker's objective function. Excessive production of commodities which use nitrogen
 intensively has adverse consequences on the surface and groundwater.
 Although the literature has extensively analyzed the fertilizer decisions under uncertainty
 (e.g., Ryan and Perrin), impacts of fertilizer regulation have received scant attention. The
 impact of risk-aversion on the ex ante level of fertilizer application is not obvious a priori.
 Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker argued that in the absence of leaching, risk-averse farmers
 use less nitrogen than risk-neutral farmers and suggested that a subsidy (negative tax) be
 used to encourage risk-averse farmers to use more nitrogen (p. 1 82). Others have argued that
 risk-averse farmers use more nitrogen than risk-neutral ones (e.g., Ryan and Perrin). In these
 E. Kwan Choi is a professor in the Department of Economics at Iowa State University. Eli Feinerman is a senior lecturer in the
 Department of Agricultural Economics and Management, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
 Financial support for this research was provided through BARD project No. US-1601-89. This is Journal Paper No. J-15723
 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa (Project 2973).
 1 Water polluted with nitrogen possesses health risks. Specifically, nitrites (NO2) in drinking water oxidizes the hemoglobin
 in the blood and forms methemoglobin which is lethal in small doses for embryos and babies (Lee). Second, production
 uncertainty causes risk-averse farmers to use nitrogen as insurance against potential yield losses.
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 studies, producers are assumed to make production decisions ex ante, before uncertainty is
 resolved.
 In light of increased nitrogen use and its adverse environmental consequences, there is
 a need to develop an analytical model to investigate the impacts of policies to regulate farm-
 level nitrogen use, taking farmers' attitudes toward risk into account. This paper borrows
 the conceptual framework of Yohe ( 1 976; 1 978) and Weitzman comparing taxes and quotas
 under uncertainty and investigates the effects of taxes and quotas on nitrogen application
 for risk-neutral and risk-averse farmers. We assume that some nitrogen is applied ex ante
 before a random event (rainfall) is observed, and sidedressed nitrogen may be applied ex
 post. Thus, risk-averse farmers retain flexibility to adjust inputs after the random event is
 observed. While split nitrogen application decision has been investigated (Feinerman, Choi,
 and Johnson), the impacts of regulation on nitrogen use in agriculture have not received
 much attention.
 With the advanced irrigation technologies (e.g., drip irrigation), most of the irrigated
 water is taken up by plant roots, and hence, leaching of nitrogen applied via the irrigation
 system is negligible. However, random rainfall can increase soil moisture over field capacity
 and cause leaching of nitrogen below the root zone to the groundwater aquifer. Since
 sidedressed nitrogen is applied after the rainy season, we assume that it is not subject to
 leaching. Thus, the first-best policy is to control ex ante nitrogen application only.
 Yield and Nitrogen Leaching
 Consider a representative farmer who grows an irrigated crop using water, nitrogen, and
 other inputs. In order to focus on nitrogen application, nonnitrogen inputs including land,
 machinery, and labor are assumed to be fixed.
 Nitrogen is applied continuously via the irrigation system throughout the growing season.
 However, to facilitate the analysis, we divide the growing season into two periods and
 assume that nitrogen is applied only twice, one application in each period. A random event,
 rainfall, occurs only during period one, affecting both soil moisture content and soil nitrogen
 available to the crop. While some nitrogen is applied ex ante (before rainfall) at the beginning
 of period one, that is, the beginning of the growing season, sidedressed nitrogen also can be
 applied ex post after rainfall is observed.
 With the advanced irrigation system (drip irrigation), the farmer is able to maintain any
 desired level of soil moisture, W . Obviously, the level of W is dependent on the cost of
 irrigation. Since some irrigation is always done, irrigation set-up costs are irrelevant for our
 analysis, and only variable costs (hereafter price per unit of water) should be considered. In
 order to focus on nitrogen use, it is assumed that at the relevant range of water and nitrogen
 prices, the optimal level of soil moisture content W* is such that water stress to plants is
 eliminated or negligible. Maintaining soil moisture at this level is a commonly used
 agricultural practice in many regions of Israel. Obviously, the amount of irrigation water
 required to support the level W* depends on the rainfall. Specifically, the amount of
 supplemental irrigation water required 'sW - Z, where Z is the random quantity of rainfall
 during the growing season. If the rainfall exceeds the threshold level w' no irrigation water
 is applied. Thus, the random cost of irrigation water is max [w(W* - Z), 0], where w is the
 price per unit of irrigation water.
 In addition to soil moisture W, the amount of soil nitrogen available to plants is an
 important determinant of yield. Let A be the initial stock of plant-available nitrogen in the
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 soil at the beginning of period one, which includes nitrogen carryover from the previous
 period and can be observed by soil tests. Let Xand 7be the nitrogen applied at the beginning
 of period one and the quantity of nitrogen applied in period two (after rainfall), respectively.
 Random rainfall can increase soil moisture over field capacity and cause leaching of nitrogen
 below the root zone to the groundwater aquifer. The total amount of nitrogen in the soil at
 the beginning of the season is {A + X). Obviously, the more nitrogen carryover from the
 previous period, the less application X is required to maintain a given level of nitrogen in
 the soil at the beginning of period one. Nitrogen uptake by the plant at the beginning of
 period one (before rainfall) is {A + X) ô, where ô is the uptake rate, 0 <> ô <, 1 . The total amount
 of plant available nitrogen subject to leaching is thus (A + X){' - ô).
 In period two, after rainfall is observed, some nitrogen can be applied as sidedressing.
 Since it is assumed that no rainfall occurs between the end of the current growing season
 and the beginning of the next (the off-season period), nitrogen applied ex post, Y, is not
 subject to leaching. This assumption applies to the situation presented in the empirical
 analysis (wheat grown in Israel). However, it eliminates interseasonal dynamics and,
 therefore, limits the generality of the analysis. The amount of nitrogen leached, Z,, depends
 on the random rainfall and is equal to 6Z( 1 - 6)(A + X)9 where 6 is the rate of nitrogen leached
 beyond the root zone, 0 < ô < 1 . More simply,
 (1) Z, = ßZ(v4 + *),
 where ß= 6(1 - ô) > 0. For simplicity of exposition, the stock of nitrogen at the beginning
 of period one, the term A is suppressed in the mathematical analysis, but it is explicitly
 treated in the empirical application.
 Yield is assumed to depend on the soil moisture W, the nitrogen applied at the beginning
 of the growing season (i.e., beginning of period one), and the plant-available nitrogen in
 period two after the application of sidedressed nitrogen, N = (y - ßZ)X+ Y, where y= 1 -
 ô. Note that this expression describes the within-season dynamics of nitrogen carryover.
 Thus, yield can be represented by a production function q =f(X, N, W). Recall that the soil
 moisture is maintained at the threshold level w' Suppressing W* as an argument, the
 production can be written
 (2) q = F(X,N) = FlX9(y -ßZ)X+7].
 The function F() is assumed to be monotone increasing and concave in both arguments, X
 and N. Adequate quantities of Xãt the beginning of the season help the plant develop an
 efficient root system and, as a result, increase the efficiency of nitrogen uptake during the
 growing season. Thus, X and N may be complements (FNX > 0), substitutes (FNX < 0), or
 independent (FNX = 0). In the empirical analysis, FNX was not found to be significantly
 different from zero.
 Production Decisions under First-Best Taxes
 To control nitrogen leaching a policy maker may employ either taxes or quotas on nitrogen
 application. Since the actual level of rainfall and the associated nitrogen leaching can be
 2It can be revived by placing X by (A+X) henceforth.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.188 on Wed, 31 Aug 2016 18:49:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Choi, Feinerman Taxes versus Quotas 1 25
 observed, state-contingent taxes or quotas on nitrogen can be employed. In this section we
 investigate production decisions under first-best tax and quota and demonstrate welfare
 equivalence of the two policies. We assume that the policy maker observes the ex ante
 application Xand knows the values of ß and Z = EZ. With a target level of expected
 leaching L = $EZX, the policy maker can control ex ante application directly by imposing
 a quota X = LfiEZ, or indirectly by imposing a tax t on X.
 Consider the production decision problem when a first-best tax t is levied on ex ante
 application but not on ex post application. To provide a common reference point to compare
 production decisions under a quota and a tax, we assume that the producer receives a
 lump-sum tax rebate, /?, which does not distort production decisions. This rebate scheme is
 consistent with the literature that compares taxes/tariffs and quotas on production/imports
 (e.g., Weitzman; Yohe 1976; Choi and Lapan; Choi and Johnson).
 Ex Post Nitrogen Application
 The farmer observes Z and then chooses Y in period two to maximize the profit:
 (3) n'=pF[X,(y - $Z)X+ T[-s{Y + X)-tX- w{W* -Z)+ tf,
 where p is output price, s is per unit cost of nitrogen, t is per unit nitrogen tax, w is the price
 of irrigation water, and R is a lump-sum tax rebate.3 The first-order condition is
 (4) pFN[X,(y-pZ)X+Y]-s = O,
 where a subscript denotes a partial derivative. Observe that the level of nitrogen applied ex
 ante, X, is fixed in period two. The ex post nitrogen demand, which solves (4), can be written
 as Y = Y(s, p, X, Z). Differentiating (4) with respect to the decision variables Y and the
 parameters t, s, p, X, and Z gives
 (5a) Y, = 0,
 (5b) Ys = l/pFNN<0,
 (5c) YP = -s/p2FNN>0,
 (5d) Yx = -FNX I FNN - (y - ßZ), and
 Obviously, some fraction of nitrogen is carried over to the next period. According to an accounting method, such nitrogen
 carryover is an investment in a sense, and an argument can be made to include its discounted value in the current profit n.
 However, in this case the value of nitrogen carryover from the previous growing season should also be deducted from current
 profit. While this method may also be adequate, it would complicate the present economic analysis unnecessarily without
 yielding additional insights. To simplify the economic analysis, nitrogen carryover from the previous growing season, A% rather
 than the carryover to the next, is included in the profit function. In a stationary situation, such nitrogen carryover is constant
 across the years, and the two methods are identical, except the discount factor. It can be shown easily that under the specific
 assumptions considered here, the level of A is unchanged over time.
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 (5e) Yz = £X>0.
 In the derivation of (5a) - (5c), Jf was treated as a predetermined fixed parameter. Since the
 tax is imposed on ex ante fertilization only, it does not affect the ex post application directly
 and hence, t is absent as an argument in Y(s,p9 X, Z) and Yt = 0 in (5a). The ex post nitrogen
 demand Y(s, p, X, Z) is incorporated into the ex ante application problems in (6) and (8)
 presented below. Differentiating N = (y - ßZ)X+ Y(s, p, X, Z) with respect to Z and using
 (5e) yields
 (5f) dN/dZ = -$X+Yz=0, and
 (5g) dN/dX = (y-fiZ)+Yx = -FNX/FNN.
 Equation (5f) implies that plant-available nitrogen in period two after rainfall is observed,
 N9 is independent of the random rainfall Z. An economic interpretation for this result is
 straightforward. Some portion of nitrogen applied early will be leached below the root zone
 because of rainfall. After observing the rainfall, the farmer adds sidedressed nitrogen to
 insure a constant level of plant-available nitrogen N required to maximize profit ex post.
 Because of split nitrogen application, farmers can make up the loss of nitrogen through
 leaching and hence retain input flexibility to respond to random weather.
 Note from (5g) that the sign of dN/dXis identical to that of FNX. Assuming that X declines
 with y yields sign {dNIdt} = -sign {FNX} . In other words, the optimal level of plant-available
 nitrogen in period two decreases (increases) with tax if N and X are complements (substi-
 tutes). If, however, Wand ^are neutral or independent (FNX= 0), as is the case in the empirical
 example in the next section, the level of N is independent oft.
 Ex Ante Nitrogen Application
 Sidedressing of nitrogen is made in period two after the random rainfall Z is observed and,
 hence, is not directly affected by risk attitudes. However, the application decision of nitrogen
 applied ex ante, X, crucially depends on risk preference of the producer. We first consider
 ex ante nitrogen application decisions under a tax scheme for a risk-neutral and a risk-averse
 farmer, and compare them with those obtained under a nitrogen quota scheme.
 Risk Neutrality. A risk-neutral farmer's problem at the beginning of period one is to
 choose Jfto maximize the expected profit:
 (6) En" =pEF[X,(y -$Z)X+Y(sJ9X,Z)]-s(EY+X)-tX-w(W* -EZ) + R,
 where E is the expectation operator. Recall that although Z is random, the farmer insures a
 constant level of plant-available nitrogen in period two, N = (y-ß Z)X + Y(s, /?, X, Z).
 4However, t (as well as p and s) affects Y indirectly through a change in X. The total effect of a tax change is dYldt = Yt +
 Yx{dXldi). Assuming that X declines as the tax increases, the indirect effect of / on Y depends on the sign of Yx. If, for example,
 the inputs N and X are either substitutes or independent (FNX <; 0), Yx is negative (5d), and hence, Y increases as t increases. If
 FNX >0*Y may increase witn x and decreases with /. The indrect effect of t (as well as those of 5 and p) through a change in
 X depends on risk aversion. Specifically, from equations (7) and (10) below, it can be shown that dXIdt = - EnXi lEn^ for a
 risk-neutral farmer, whereas dXIdt = -EUXt IEUXX for a risk-averse farmer.
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 Moreover, observe that since N is independent of Z, yield F(X, N) is not random. The
 first-order condition is
 En x = pEFx + pFNE(y - ßZ + Yx)-sE(Yx + 1)-/ = 0.
 Since N and F are independent of Z and pFN = sin (4), we get
 (7) En x = pFx[X, (y - $Z)X+ Y] - s(8 + ß£Z) - 1 = 0.
 Thus, the derived demand for ex ante nitrogen of a risk-neutral farmer is written as Xu =
 X(p, s, t, ß , £Z). Note thaipFx is the value of marginal product of X, and ß£Z is the expected
 leaching rate. In the absence of tax, the equilibrium condition is pF^iò + ß£Z) = s =pFN.
 Observe thatpFy^ô + ß£Z) is the value of marginal product of X, adjusted for leaching,
 and must be equal to the value of marginal product of Y, which is not subject to leaching.
 Thus, s(ò + ß£Z) is the opportunity cost of nitrogen applied ex ante in the absence of tax.
 Risk Aversion. At the beginning of period one, a risk-averse farmer chooses ^to maximize
 the expected utility:
 (8) EU[nal] = EU{pF[X, (y -ßZ)X+ Y]-s(Y + X)-tX- w(W* -Z) + /?},
 where [/(•) is a monotone increasing and concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
 function, W (•) > 0, !/"(•) < 0. The first-order condition is
 (9) E[Ufnx] = EU'En x + cov(C/f, n x) = 0,
 where nx = pFx[X, (y - ßZ)Jf+ F] - 5(5 + ßZ) - 1. Note that since TV is independent of Z,
 dnjdz =nxz = -s$ < 0, and dU' IdZ = U"nz, where nz = w -/?/^ ß^= w - ^ßX Thus,
 the sign of nz depends on the per unit price of irrigation water w, nitrogen fertilizer s, and
 the leaching rate ß In places where water is scarce (e.g., Israel), the price of irrigation water
 is much higher than nitrogen fertilizer and nz is positive, that is, an increase in rainfall
 increases profits. We assume that nz > 0 because of scarcity of water.
 Let A*7' denote the optimal ex ante nitrogen application of a risk-averse farmer. Assuming
 nz > 0 implies that cov(t/f , nx ) > 0 in (9), and hence, Enx < 0 at Xat. Since Enx = 0 at A"'
 in (7), and En is concave in X by second-order condition, a risk-averse farmer uses more X
 than a risk-neutral farmer, that is, Xe" > Xth '.
 Proposition 1: Assume that a first-best tax is imposed on ex ante application only and
 that nz > 0. Then a risk-averse farmer applies more nitrogen ex ante than a risk-neutral
 farmer, that is, Xat > X"1.
 5Note that 7iz> 0 implies an upper bound for the level of ex ante application, that is, X< w/.v(i Based on the data used in the
 empirical example presented in the next section, the value of this upper bound is 1 86.9 kg/ha, whereas the highest level of
 optimal ex ante application (for a risk-averse farmer when / = 0) is less than 1 30 kg/ha (see table 1 ).
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.188 on Wed, 31 Aug 2016 18:49:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1 28 July 1 995 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
 Action Equivalent First-Best Taxes under Risk-Neutrality and Risk-Aversion
 Suppose the policy maker wishes to limit the expected nitrogen leaching below a target level
 I . Then the ex ante application Jfmust be limited to X = L I $EZ. The value of tax to achieve
 the desired level of ex ante application, X , will depend on the risk attitude of the producer.
 Let t" denote the tax rate which yields an ex ante application rate, X , for a risk-neutral farmer,
 and let f be similarly defined for a risk-averse farmer. We now compare the action equivalent
 tax rates for a risk-averse and a risk-neutral farmer. Differentiating (9) with respect to t gives
 (10) ôX/dt = -EUXt/EUxx,
 where EUXX < 0 by second-order condition, and
 EUXt = EU"n tnx + EU'n Xt ,
 (11) nXt=pFNXYt-' = -'<0, and
 nt=(pFN-s)Yt-X=-X<0.
 Since nt is independent of Z,
 (12a) EU"n xn , = n ([EU"n x] = -X[EU"n x]9 and
 (12b) EU'nXt=-EU'<0.
 Assuming diminishing absolute risk-aversion (DARÀ), it can be shown that EU"n x>0.
 Let Z be the value of Z for which nx = 0. Recall that n^ = -s ß < 0, that is, nx is decreasing
 in Z. Thus,
 7i^<(>)0, for Z>(<)Z'
 Moreover, tt() is monotone increasing (dn I ôZ > 0). Thus, given DARÀ,
 R[n(Z)]<R[n(Z*)l if Z>Z'
 Multiply both sides by U'[n]n x, which is negative for Z > Z*.
 (13) -U"[n]nx>R*U'nx.
 For Z < Z' R[n(Z)] > R* and U'[n]n x>0. Hence, the inequality (13) holds for Z * Z*.
 Integrate (13) over the entire range to get
 -EU"nx<R*EU'nx=09
 where the right side vanishes by the first-order condition (9). Thus, given DARÀ,
 EU"nx > 0. Therefore, EU"nxn( in (12a) is negative. Equations (12a) and (12b) imply
 that EUXt in (1 1) is negative, and hence, ôXI dt in (10) is negative (given DARÀ). That is,
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 an increase in tax reduces the level of ex ante application X of a risk-averse farmer. This
 result, together with that of Proposition 1, implies the following result:
 Proposition 2: Assume that a first-best tax is imposed on ex ante ajsplication only and
 that farmers exhibit DARÀ. Then in order to attain a target level of X , a higher tax must
 be imposed on a risk-averse farmer than on a risk-neutral farmer, that is, f > tn.
 It should be noted that profits without rebates will depend on risk attitudes. We show,
 however, that profit after the tax is rebated is independent of risk attitudes. Noting that f
 and f are action equivalent (they both yield the same levels of ex ante application, X*) and
 substituting R = fX* into (6), we obtain the profit of a risk-neutral farmer:
 (6') nnt=pFlX'(y-PZ)X* + Y(s, p9 jf, Z)]-s{Y + X*)-w{W* -Z).
 Similarly, substituting R = fX into (6) for a risk-averse farmer, the random profits of the
 risk-neutral and the risk-averse producers are the same for each value of Z, as in (6' ), that
 is, nat = nnt. In other words, with tax rebate, profit is independent of risk attitude under the
 first-best tax scheme.
 First-Best Quotas
 For an expected leaching target L , the policy maker can directly control the ex ante
 application by imposing a quota Jf* = L I$EZ. In this case, there is no ex ante optimization
 problem. In period two after Z is observed, the producer chooses Y to maximize the profit:
 (14) nx=pF'X' (y -$Z)X* + Y]-s{Y + X*)-w(W* -Z).
 Consider an ex ante quota Jf* and a tax f on ex ante application that are action equivalent
 for a risk-neutral farmer, that is, Xnt = X' Then the ex post problem with an ex ante quota
 X* is exactly the same as that under the equivalent ex ante tax f. Since no tax is imposed on
 ex post nitrogen application, the ex post application problem with an ex ante j[uota X* is
 exactly the same as that under the action equivalent tax f which yields Xnt = X*. Thus, the
 ex ante nitrogen tax f and the ex ante nitrogen quota X* = Xnt yield the same profit after
 rebate at all states, that is, nnt = it* for the risk-neutral farmer, and hence, Ennt = Enx.
 Moreover, for a given ex ante quota X*, the ex post application Y is determined after Z is
 realized. Thus, the ex post application Y and profit are independent of risk attitudes, and
 hence nx in (13) is the same for risk-neutral and risk-averse farmers.
 Assume that X* and f are action equivalent for a risk-averse farmer. Then the same
 argument can be used to show that Xat = x' and hence, the ex post application problem is
 the same, regardless of risk attitudes, that is, nat = nx for the risk-averse farmer. Thus, EU[nat]
 = EU[nxl
 Proposition 3: Let tn and X be a first-best tax and a first-best quota that are action
 equivalent on ex ante application for a risk-neutral farmer, and let f and X be action
 equivalent for a risk-averse farmer. Then the first-best tax and the first-best quota are
 also welfare equivalent, whether producers are risk-neutral or risk-averse, that is, iznt =
 nat = 7iö, and EizHt = Etzx, and EU[nat] = EU[izx].
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 An Example: Wheat in Israel
 To estimate the production function F in (2) and the nitrogen uptake rate, 5, we used
 experimental data for an irrigated wheat (cultivar "Miriam 1") from Kafkafi and Bar Yosef.
 The wheat was seeded in the middle of November 1969 and harvested in mid-May 1970.
 The rainy season relevant for our analysis is from the end of November to the end of March.
 The end of March was chosen as the end of period one and the beginning of period two.
 Using data on plant-available nitrogen in the root zone (0-40 cm), A+X,at the beginning
 of December ("beginning" of period one) and at the beginning of April (period two), we first
 estimated the production function by using ordinary least squares (OLS) for three polynomial
 functions: the quadratic, the square root, and the three halves. The polynomial forms were
 previously recommended and chosen by Hexem and Heady to represent response to nitrogen
 and water for a few selected crops. The quadratic specification performed best among the
 polynomials examined for yield with 15 observations and 10 degrees of freedom. The
 estimated yield-response function (with t- values in parentheses) is
 F=-4342.61+53.659(yi+^) -0.1210(A + .Y)2 + 71.157W -0.3255AT2,
 (3.666) (-3.056) (2.471) (-2.188)
 R2 = 0.7912,
 where the units of F, A, X, and N are in kilograms per hectare (kg/ha). Unfortunately,
 biological theory does not provide much guidance in determining appropriate functional
 form and the quadratic function is selected on statistical grounds (highest R2 and /-statistic
 values). Obviously, it may result in a positive yield even when no nitrogen is available at
 the early growth stage. However, in practice, A and A" are both positive and hence this case
 is unlikely and may be ignored. It should be emphasized that the cross product term, (A +
 X)N, was initially included in the regression equation, but the estimated value of its parameter
 was close to zero and was statistically insignificant (t < 0. 1). In other words, in the specific
 example considered, (A + X) and TV are roughly independent inputs (FNX « 0).
 The value of nitrogen uptake, ô , chosen for our illustrative example was 0.6, which is
 approximately a simple average of nitrogen uptake of the experimental plots. Unfortunately,
 the experimental results of Kafkafi and Bar- Yosef do not include information on nitrogen
 leaching below the root zone. Following a personal communication with Kafkafi, the value
 of the leaching parameter was assumed to be 0.0012, which implies ß= 6(1 - ô) = 0.0005.
 Additional parameter values chosen for the example were/? = $0.18 per kg of grain yield
 (which represents the market price net of nonnitrogen and nonwater variable costs per kg of
 wheat); s = $1.07 per kg of pure inorganic nitrogen fertilizer; w = $0.10 per cubic meter of
 irrigation water; W* = 650 mm, and E(Z) = 528.75 mm, which is a simple average of 4 1 years
 of rainfall data (1950/51-1990/91) in the experimental area. The assumed value of the
 pre-planting plant-available nitrogen in the soil, A, was 100 kg/ha.
 The ex ante and ex post optimization problems for various values of t were solved for a
 risk-neutral farmer and a risk-averse farmer.6 A constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA)
 utility function, U= -nl'R9 was used for the example where R is the relative risk-aversion
 measure. To illustrate the impact of risk aversion, the chosen value of R was 123 so that a
 6Observe that under a first-best quota X* there is no ex ante optimization problem. Moreover, the ex post optimization problem
 under an ex ante quota X* is exactly the same as that under an action equivalent tax, as shown in the section on the first-best
 quotas. Thus, the empirical results for the quota problem are ommited here.
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 Table 1. Empirical Findings for a Risk-Neutral Farmer
 Plant-
 Early Available Wheat Expected
 Nitrogen Nitrogen Grain Nitrogen Expected Profits/ha
 Tax Application in Period Two Yield Leaching
 t X"1 N q T Before After
 ($/kg) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) Rebate Rebate
 0.00 100.46 100.16 5412.41 53.10 648.05 648.05
 0.05 99.32 " 5406.35 52.79 643.05 648.02
 0.10 98.17 " 5399.98 52.49 638.11 647.93
 0.15 97.02 " 5393.28 52.19 633.24 647.79
 0.20 95.87 " 5386.26 51.88 628.42 647.59
 0.23 95.18 " 5381.90 51.70 625.55 647.44
 0.25 94.73 " 5378.93 51.58 623.65 647.33
 0.30 93.57 " 5371.27 51.27 618.94 647.01
 0.35 92.43 " 5363.30 50.97 614.29 646.64
 0.40 91.28 " 5355.00 50.67 609.70 646.21
 0.50 88.99 " 5337.47 50.06 600.69 645.18
 0.60 86.69 " 5318.65 49.45 591.91 643.92
 0.65 85.54 " 5308.77 49.15 587.60 643.20
 0.70 84.40 " 5298.56 48.84 583.34 642.42
 0.80 82.10 " 5277.20 48.23 575.02 640.70
 1.00 77.51 " 5230.64 47.02 559.06 636.57
 risk-averse farmer applies about 30% more nitrogen ex ante than a risk-neutral farmer when
 no tax or quota is imposed. The results for the first-best tax for a risk-neutral and a risk-averse
 farmer are summarized in tables 1 and 2, respectively.
 Several points in the example are worth noting:
 1 . The value of plant-available nitrogen in period two, A^= 100.16 kg/ha is the same for the
 risk-neutral and risk-averse fanners. From (5g), dNIdX is positive, zero, or negative
 according to whether FNX is positive, zero, or negative. For example, if FNX were positive,
 Xat > Xnt implies A/"' > V". In our example, FNX = 0, and hence dN/dX= 0, and thus the
 plant-available nitrogen in period two is independent of risk attitude. Moreover, FNX = 0
 implies that the optimal level of TV is independent of the tax rate.
 2. Observe that since nz = 0. 1 0 - 1 .07 x 0.0005X is positive for all levels of ^fin the relevant
 range, Xat is greater than Xnt for all levels of t, as predicted by Proposition 1. This is
 particularly true for low values oft. For example, Xat is greater than Xnt by 29% when t
 = 0, and only by about 3.5% when t = 0.5. Obviously, both Xat and Xni decrease when t
 increases. Specifically, Xnt decreases linearly with / at a low rate for all levels of t'
 whereas Xa1 decreases at a high rate for low values of / and at a low rate for high values
 of t (e.g., Xat decreases by 3 1 .45% when t increases from 0 to $0.25 and only by 8.5%
 when t increases from $0.70 to $1).
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 Table 2. Empirical Findings for a Risk-Averse Farmer
 Plant-
 Early Available Wheat Expected
 Nitrogen Nitrogen Grain Nitrogen Expected Profits/ha
 Tax Application in Period Two Yield Leaching Ennt
 t X" N q L Before After
 ($/kg) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) Rebate Rebate
 0.00 129.68 100.16 5459.32 60.84 629.45 629.45
 0.05 123.56 " 5466.60 59.22 630.25 636.43
 0.10 115.93 " 5462.98 57.19 631.25 642.84
 0.15 112.92 " 5457.68 56.40 627.73 644.67
 0.20 103.48 " 5426.82 53.90 627.15 647.85
 0.23 100.94 " 5414.84 53.22 624.76 647.98
 0.25 98.65 " 5402.69 52.62 622.42 647.08
 0.30 97.98 " 5398.90 52.44 618.51 647.91
 0.35 96.11 " 5387.24 51.95 613.99 647.63
 0.40 94.44 " 5377.05 51.50 609.48 647.26
 0.50 92.09 " 5360.88 50.88 600.48 646.52
 0.60 89.69 " 5342.98 50.24 591.71 645.52
 0.65 88.53 " 5333.82 49.94 587.41 644.95
 0.70 87.38 " 5324.43 49.63 583.15 644.32
 0.80 85.08 " 5305.45 49.02 574.83 642.89
 1.00 80.49 " 5261.45 47.81 558.86 639.35
 3. Expected nitrogen leaching, L = $E(Z)X, for the risk-neutral farmer decreases linearly
 with / at a very low rate; whereas, for the risk-averse farmer it declines fast at low rates
 of t and becomes relatively insensitive to tax for values of t above $0.25. Note further
 that when t increases from zero to $1.00, L decreases by 27% (from 60.84 to 47.81 kg
 of nitrogen) for the risk-averse farmer and only by 13% (from 53. 10 to 47.02 kg) for the
 risk-neutral farmer.
 4. For the sake of illustration, assume first that the leaching target set by the policy maker
 is equal to L for the risk-neutral farmer when no tax is imposed, that is, L = 53. 10 kg/ha
 of available nitrogen (table 1 ). The tax level that yields the same target for the risk-averse
 farmer f is about $0.23/kg (table 2). These results demonstrate Proposition 2 that to attain
 a target level of expected leaching (or a target level of x' a higher tax must be imposed
 on a risk-averse farmer than on a risk-neutral farmer (f > t"). Moreover, note from table
 1 that En'u(t" = 0) = Ena'f « $0.23) « $648/ha after rebate as stated in Proposition 3.
 If the target leaching level reduces to 50 kg/ha, or the target ex ante application is X =
 89.13 kg/ha (or A + X = 189.13), then the taxes that should be imposed to attain this
 target level are about t" = $0.50/kg for the risk-neutral farmer and f = $0.65/kg for the
 risk-averse farmer, respectively. Again, f>f and Ei?'f « $0.50) = Ena'ta « $0.65)
 « $645/ha after the rebate.
 5. Obviously, the expected profit before rebate for the risk-neutral farmer is higher than for
 the risk-averse farmer, especially under the lower tax levels. For t > $0.15/kg, the
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 differences between the expected profits before rebate for a risk-neutral and a risk-averse
 farmers are negligible. But when t < $0.15, the expected profit after rebate is higher for
 the risk-neutral farmer under the low tax level. It is interesting to note that while the
 after-rebate expected profit for the risk-neutral farmer decreases monotonically as t
 increases, this is not true for the risk-averse farmer. When t increases from zero to $0.23,
 Enat after rebate increases and then remains stable for a wide range of t values.
 Concluding Remarks
 This article investigates the effects of first-best policies to regulate nitrogen use at the farm
 level. Yield is assumed to depend on the plant-available nitrogen at the beginning and after
 the rainy season. Due to random rainfall, some portion of nitrogen applied at the beginning
 of the season leaches below the root zone and contaminates the groundwater aquifer.
 Leaching of sidedressed nitrogen applied after the rainy season is assumed to be negligible.
 "First-best" policy is a tax or a quota imposed on ex ante application because ex post
 application is not subject to leaching. It is shown that a risk-averse farmer uses more nitrogen
 ex ante than a risk-neutral one to attain a target level of expected leaching, and therefore, a
 higher tax must be imposed on the former than on the latter (f > f). A first-best tax and a
 quota that are action equivalent will yield the same level of welfare, whether the farmer is
 risk-neutral or averse.
 An empirical model for wheat in Israel was used to illustrate the analytical findings. It
 is shown that the gap between Xat and X nt is higher for low tax values and that the impact
 of a tax increase from the no-tax situation on the reduction in expected leaching is greater
 for the risk-averse farmer than for the risk-neutral one. The expected profit after rebate is
 higher for the risk-neutral farmer under low tax levels {t < $0. 1 5/kg) and slightly lower when
 t exceeds $0.15. The numerical example also shows that under certain conditions, expected
 profit (not utility) of a risk-averse farmer may be higher with taxes than without them,
 provided that taxes are rebated.
 Although first-best taxes and quotas are efficient measures to achieve a target level of
 leaching, it may be difficult to enforce them in practice. First-best quotas or taxes are applied
 on ex ante nitrogen application and not on ex post application, because leaching of nitrogen
 applied ex post is negligible. If the storage cost of nitrogen is not prohibitively high, farmers
 may purchase and store nitrogen at the end of a season and use it at the beginning of the next
 season, thereby effectively evading nitrogen tax or quota. This possibility of tax or quota
 evasion points to the need for studying second-best policies to regulate nitrogen use.
 If the split between ex ante and ex post applications is not easily observed by the policy
 maker, total nitrogen use may be monitored by controlling the supply of nitrogen. When the
 storage cost is not prohibitively high, it may be practical to control total nitrogen use, which
 is a second-best policy. Analysis of second-best policies can be found in Feinerman and
 Choi. Many public utilities (e.g., electricity) can monitor the timing of consumption and
 charge different rates accordingly. Thus, if the government can monitor early nitrogen use
 or if the storage cost is high, then first-best policy is not only feasible but may also be
 practical.
 [Received September 1993; final version received October 1995.]
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